Abstract: Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, precipitating a mass outmigration of evacuees from the U.S. Gulf Coast region. A substantial number of evacuees fled to the Houston, TX metropolitan area, where the population rose by 3.8 percent. Using data from the
I.

Introduction
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the U.S. Gulf Coast as a category three storm on the morning of August 29, 2005 . With winds reaching speeds of 130 miles per hour and storm surges as high as 27 feet, Katrina caused unprecedented damage along the coasts of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. The vast devastation of the Gulf Coast precipitated a mass outmigration of residents. While no official data are available on the number, location, or characteristics of evacuees, unofficial estimates suggest that 100,000 to 150,000 evacuees moved to the Houston, TX metropolitan area. This represents roughly a three to four percent increase in the metro area's population (DeParle 2006; Campo-Flores 2005) . And, as some anecdotal evidence suggests, many evacuees expect to stay in the Houston metro area indefinitely (Romero 2005; Saulny 2005) .
It is also known that Katrina disproportionately affected minorities and the disadvantaged. Gabe et al. (2005) show that among evacuees who experienced significant structural, flooding, or water damage in their place of residence, approximately one-half are black. The pre-Katrina poverty rate among these most acutely affected evacuees was nearly double the national rate. In addition, their educational attainment and pre-storm labor force participation rates lagged behind national averages, while their pre-storm unemployment rates outpaced the national rate. Yet, these statistics should come as no surprise since Katrina struck an area that is considered to be one of the most disadvantaged in the United States.
In this paper, I examine the effect of the migration of Katrina evacuees on the Houston metropolitan .labor market. More specifically, I use Current Population Survey data from September, 2000 to August, 2006 to consider how wages and employment among native Houstonians changed with the addition of Katrina evacuees to the labor market. To quantify the effect of Hurricane Katrina migration, I compare wages and employment before and after the storm among non-evacuees residing in Houston and in other metro areas that were not affected by the storm. In addition, I allow the effects to vary by gender, education, and race and ethnicity.
The existing studies of the effect of immigration on the labor market outcomes among native-born workers provide a good point of comparison for this analysis. Economic theory suggests that the arrival of new workers to a labor market may result in lower wages and employment among native-born workers, as a result of increased competition for jobs. The extent to which labor market outcomes worsen among native-born workers depends on how comparable the newly-arrived workers and the native-born workers are. In the present context, how much the arrival of Hurricane Katrina evacuees affects native Houstonians is a function of how similar the evacuees are to native Houstonian workers on the dimensions that are usually related to wages and employment, such as age, gender, education, race, and ethnicity.
II. Theoretical Underpinnings and Previous Literature
I consider a simple model of the supply and demand for labor in a local labor market. I assume that native Houstonians and evacuees are substitutes in production and that the labor supply and demand curves are imperfectly elastic. Assuming that some of the evacuees are looking for employment, the arrival of evacuees into Houston's local labor market will cause an increase in the supply of labor. 1 This increase in the labor supply will increase competition for jobs, leading to a fall in wages and the probability of being employed among native Houstonians, as some native Houstonians are displaced by evacuees in the labor market. The size of the drop 1 The migration of evacuees into the Houston metro area may also cause an outward shift in the labor demand curve through increased demand for locally-consumed and locally-produced goods and services. However, as is often done in short-run studies, I assume that the shift in labor demand is of a much smaller magnitude than the shift in labor supply, and therefore I do not take it into consideration.
in wages and employment among native Houstonians is an empirical question, one that will be addressed in the remainder of this paper.
Parallels may be drawn between this chapter and the literature on the labor market effects of immigration (see Card (2005) and Friedberg and Hunt (1995) for reviews of this literature). In a study similar to this one, Kugler and Yuksel (2006) respondents who do not appear in an outgoing rotation group during the sample period, I retain their information from the first month in which they appear in the sample. Table 1 shows the estimated number of evacuees and their share of the total population by core-based statistical area (CBSA), among CBSAs in which at least one evacuee appears in the CPS. For the purposes of this paper, a CBSA can be thought of as a metropolitan area. 5 As seen in Table 1 , roughly 75,000 of the more than 540,000 evacuees identified in the CPS are in the Houston metro area (or, "Houston-Baytown-Sugar Land, TX"), with approximately 21,000
evacuees appearing in the city of Houston alone. 6 These figures represent a 3.8 and 2.9 percent shock to the Houston metro area and city populations, respectively. Restricting attention to the working-age population 7 , which is a good proxy for labor supply, reveals a labor supply shock of similar magnitude.
4 Each CPS respondent is part of an outgoing rotation group twice while they participate in the survey, once during their fourth month in the sample and again during their eighth month in the sample. However, since a respondent's fourth and eighth months in the sample are separated by twelve calendar months and since the sample period for Tables 1-3 is only ten months long (November, 2005 -August, 2006 , it is impossible for a respondent to appear in an outgoing rotation group twice during that period. 5 The term CBSA refers collectively to metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas, each of which consist of a substantial population nucleus plus the adjacent communities with which that nucleus has a high degree of economic and social integration. Census 2000 standards require that each CBSA must contain at least one urban area with a population of at least 10,000. Each metropolitan statistical area must have at least one urbanized area with a population of at least 50,000, while each micropolitan statistical area must have at least one urban cluster with a population of least 10,000 but no more than 50,000 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2006b). 6 The estimates in Table 1 are likely to be an undercount of the number of evacuees in the Houston metro area and across the United States as a whole. Indeed, estimates from other sources range from 100,000 to 150,000 evacuees in the Houston metro area and over 700,000 evacuees in all. Since the sample unit for the CPS is a house, apartment, or other residential unit, evacuees who sought refuge in shelters, hotels, or other nonresidential units are not part of the CPS sampling frame and therefore would not be included in the sample. However, evacuees who were living in CPS sample households before the storm and returned to those households by the time the survey was conducted are included in the sample. In addition, it is also possible that some evacuees who did not live in CPS sample households before the storm moved into residences that were part of the CPS sampling frame and therefore would have been included in the sample (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2006a). 7 Working-age is defined as age 16 to 64.
However, the Houston metro area is certainly not the only metro area for which the CPS identifies a great number of evacuees. It should come as no surprise that the New Orleans metro area itself is home to the most evacuees, more than 170,000 as identified in my sample, since many evacuees had already returned to their homes by the time of the survey. In addition, other metro areas also experienced large influxes of evacuees (i.e., Daphne-Fairhope and Mobile in Alabama, Naples-Marco Island and Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent in Florida, Baton Rouge and Lake Charles in Louisiana, and Gulfport-Biloxi in Mississippi). But, these metro areas either were in the direct path of the storm (i.e., Baton Rouge, Gulfport-Biloxi, and Mobile) or have very small sample sizes in the CPS (i.e., Daphne-Fairhope, Lake Charles, Naples-Marco Island,
and Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent). Therefore, I chose to focus on the Houston metro area for this analysis since, among metro areas not in the storm's path, the Houston metro area both received a substantial number of evacuees and has a relatively large sample size in the CPS. Tables 2 and 3 Katrina evacuees are not a random sub-sample of the overall population), there are, nonetheless, some noteworthy differences. Evacuees, both across the U.S. and in the Houston metro area, are significantly less likely to be employed or in the labor force after Katrina than non-evacuees, and there is some evidence that evacuees across the country are earning significantly lower wages than non-evacuees.
In addition, there are also differences in the occupational and industrial distribution of evacuees and non-evacuees. In particular, Table 2 shows that, compared to employed nonevacuees, a significantly larger share of employed evacuees across the U.S. is employed in clerical and less-skilled services occupations and a significantly smaller share is employed in professional or technical occupations. Moreover, employed evacuees nationally are significantly more likely to be in natural resources, mining, and construction; retail trade; and leisure and hospitality industries and less likely to be in non-durable goods manufacturing industries, T 's are metro area and month/year fixed effects. The wage regression is estimated 10 The results presented in the next section are robust to small perturbations in this threshold. 11 In the results presented below, the estimated effects change only slightly when the group of comparison metro areas is limited to those in Texas' neighboring states (Arkansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma; Louisiana is excluded for obvious reasons) or to all other metro areas in the state of Texas that were not impacted by Katrina, However, the standard errors increase substantially due to the reduction in sample size.
using weighted least squares and the employment regression is estimated as a weighted probit, where the weights are the CPS final weight. 12 The coefficient of interest, 3 β , identifies the effect of Hurricane Katrina migration on wages or on the probability of being employed among nonevacuees in the Houston metro area in the post-Katrina period relative to those outcomes for non-evacuees in the comparison metro areas.
V. Results Table 4 shows the difference-in-differences estimates for the wage and employment regressions. 13 As implied by my simple model of the labor market and by the findings from the immigration literature, I find that Hurricane Katrina migration is associated with a 1.8 percent decline in wages and 0.5 percentage point decline in the probability of being employed among native Houstonians, and both estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels.
In Tables 5, 6 , and 7, I repeat the difference-in-differences analysis separately by gender, level of education, and race and ethnicity. In Table 5 , I find that wage and employment effects are relatively small for male non-evacuees, who experience an insignificant 0.7 percent drop in wages and a significant 0.3 percentage point drop in the probability of being employed. In contrast, female non-evacuees were more adversely affected, with wages dropping by a significant 3.1 percent and the probability of being employed dropping by a significant 0.9 percentage points. However, these differences by gender in the wage and employment effects are not statistically significant.
At first glance, the gender-stratified results may seem counterintuitive because of the large body of empirical evidence which shows that male labor supply is less responsive to a change in wages relative to female labor supply, resulting in a steeper wage-employment relationship as is traced out by the male labor demand curve. If this is the case, then I would expect to find larger wage and employment effects among men for a given change in the labor supply, which is the opposite of what I find. However, this can be explained by accounting for differences in the evacuee share of total employment by industry and by occupation. As I alluded to above, I find that female native Houstonians are significantly more likely than male native Houstonians to be employed in industries or occupations in which evacuees comprise a greater share of total employment. Therefore, while the wage and employment differences-in-differences estimates for men and women are not significantly different from each other, female native Houstonians faced greater labor market competition due to the arrival of evacuees, and this accounts for the relatively larger effects among women.
In Table 6 , I find that the wage effects for the two lowest education groups, those with less than and those with only a high school degree, are positive and significant (1.8 and 1.4 percent), while the wage effects for the two highest education groups, those who attended some college and those who have a college degree, are negative and significant (-6.2 and -5.8 percent).
The employment effects, however, are negative and significant (-1.2, -0.7, and -0.3 percentage points) for the three highest education groups, while the employment effect for the lowest education group is positive (0.7 percentage points) but only marginally significant.
Contrary to the common finding in the immigration literature that the least educated group is the most adversely affected by immigration, my results suggest that the arrival of Katrina evacuees had the most negative impact on highly educated native Houstonians. While the difference in the estimated effect by education is statistically significant for wages, it is insignificant for employment. I again find that this can be explained by differences in the evacuee share of employment across the industries and occupations in which less-and moreeducated non-evacuees are employed, using the approach described earlier, but replacing the female indicator with education indicators. In particular, native Houstonians with more than a high school degree are significantly more likely than other native Houstonians to work in industries or occupations in which evacuees comprise a greater share of total employment. This implies that more-educated Native Houstonians faced relatively greater labor market competition after the arrival of evacuees, which can account for their experiencing relatively more adverse wage and employment effects.
Finally, Table 7 shows the difference-in-differences estimates separately by race and ethnicity. The wage and employment effects for white, non-Hispanic native Houstonians are larger in magnitude than the overall effects, showing a significant drop in wages of 5.6 percent and a significant drop in the probability of being employed of one percentage point. Non-white, non-Hispanic native Houstonians, on the contrary, experienced a significant 2.2 percent increase in wages and an insignificant change in the probability of being employed. Wage and employment estimates for Hispanic native Houstonians of any race were only marginally significant. While the characterization of evacuees provided in Table 3 would suggest that labor market competition should be greatest among non-white, non-Hispanics, that supposition is not upheld by my results. Non-Hispanic whites experience a greater decrease in wages and employment than non-Hispanic non-whites and Hispanics. However, the differences by race and ethnicity are only marginally statically significant for the wage results, and they are statistically insignificant for the employment results. Again, I find evidence that non-Hispanic whites face a greater degree of competition with evacuees in Houston, since they are significantly more likely to be employed in occupations in which evacuees comprise a greater share of total employment.
VI. Conclusion
My main finding -that the 3.8 percent increase in the Houston metro area population due to the in-migration of Katrina evacuees led to a statistically significant 1.8 percent decline in wages and a statistically significant 0.5 percentage point reduction in the probably of being However, the results by gender, education, and race and ethnicity produce some surprising findings. While both male and female native Houstonians experience a drop in wages and in the probability of being employed, the effects are larger for women. With respect to education, I find that native Houstonians with higher levels of education are more adversely affected by the arrival of the evacuees than are those with lower levels of education. And, lastly, non-minority native Houstonians are more adversely affected than are minority native Houstonians. However, most of these differences are not statistically significant, and each can be explained by the industrial or occupational distributions of native Houstonians and evacuees.
Indeed, the evidence supports the notion that female, highly-educated, and non-Hispanic white native Houstonians are employed in industries or occupations that faced relatively greater labor market competition after the arrival of the evacuees.
One issue that remains to be addressed is the possibility of a change in the net "natural" migration rate into the Houston metro area after the arrival of the evacuees, where the net natural migration rate can be thought of the net migration rate that would have been observed in the absence of Hurricane Katrina. A concurrent decrease in the net natural migration rate into the Houston metro area would attenuate the increase in the labor supply associated with the arrival of the Katrina evacuees, and would therefore negatively bias my estimate of the effect of the migration of evacuees (Borjas, 2006) . In contrast, a concurrent increase in the net natural migration rate into the Houston metro area would have the opposite effect. However, no data on migration rates at the metro area level are available to approximate the importance of this potential bias. 14 Still, this bias is arguably quite small considering the very short-run time frame considered in this chapter and the indeterminate duration of the evacuees' stay.
Overall, the results from my analysis mirror the general findings from the literature on the effect of immigration on local labor markets. I find that wages and employment among native Note: Observations are weighted using the Current Population Survey (CPS) final weight. a The term "Core-Based Statistical Area" (CBSA) refers collectively to metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas, each of which consist of a substantial population nucleus plus the adjacent communities with which that nucleus has a high degree of economic and social integration. Census 2000 standards require that each CBSA must contain at least one urban area with a population of at least 10,000. Each metropolitan statistical area must have at least one urbanized area with a population of at least 50,000, while each micropolitan statistical area must have at least one urban cluster with a population of least 10,000 but no more than 50,000.
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